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1559 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS AND THE 
JAPANESE SUPREME COURT 
TOKUJIN MATSUDAIRA

 
I. INTRODUCTION: GERMAN LEGACY 
In his Article, Professor Matsui provides us with a general explanation 
of judicial conservatism in Japan.
1
 He points out that the Supreme Court of 
Japan is self-restrained because it is staffed with Justices who share a 
collective mentality of self-restraint. He also argues, among other things, 
that this kind of ―judicial passivism‖ has its root in ―traditional German 
constitutional philosophy‖—that is, the positivist interpretation of the 
written constitution that was dominant in prewar Japan.  
I agree with Professor Matsui’s observation that the doctrines and 
standards of review the Court has adopted in the name of Americanization 
are disguises of the fin de siècle German conceptual jurisprudence.
2
 This 
statutory positivism, which was preconditioned by legal-political 
philosophy specific to German nation building, discourages public lawyers 
from questioning the legitimacy of government.
3
 Instead, it requires them 
to apply systematized juristic propositions prescribed in statutes to 
concrete cases and controversies regarding infringement of rights. The 
Dogmatik can be applied in a very liberal or conservative fashion, but is 
itself everlasting.
4
  
I hesitate, however, to overestimate the dogmatic character of Japanese 
conservatism. The German heritage theory cannot account for why 
Japanese Justices did not follow a different constitutional philosophy like 
that adopted in today’s Germany, which favors more judicial control of 
 
 
  Assistant Professor, Teikyo University Faculty of Law. LL.B., University of Tokyo; LL.M., 
University of Washington; Ph.D. candidate, Law, University of Tokyo. I am grateful to Professors 
Yoichi Higuchi, Kenji Ishikawa, Shojiro Sakaguchi, Tom Ginsburg, Ralf Poscher, Carl Goodman, and 
Joji Shishido for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  
 1. Shigenori Matsui, Why is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1375 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914–1945, at 14–19 
(Thomas Dunlap trans., 2004); Stefan Korioth, The Shattering of Methods in Late Wilhelmine 
Germany, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 41, 41–44 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard 
Schlink eds., 2002). 
 4. See RALF POSCHER, GRUNDRECHTE ALS ABWEHRRECHTE [BASIC RIGHTS AS DEFENSIVE 
RIGHTS] 24, 31 (2003); Olivier Jouanjan, Freedom of Expression in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
84 IND. L.J. 867, 869 (2009). 
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politics through constitutional adjudication.
5
 It is apparent that what 
controls the Japanese high court’s ―conscience‖ is something else lurking 
in its dogmatic judgments.
6
  
In contrast to Professor Matsui, I argue that the Japanese conservatism 
is ostensible. We should look at the ―rationale for rationale‖—that is, an 
invisible constitution that invests government activities with a 
comprehensive presumption of constitutionality. According to the organic 
theory of state, the limit of government powers lies in the government’s 
abuse of power, rather than its lack of authority. By contrast, individual 
rights function as a trump that exempts citizens from excessive 
government interference, and that is why their definition should be left to 
the judiciary.
7
 Indeed, the Japanese Supreme Court is reluctant to 
―judicialize‖ politics when rights and entitlements of the citizen are not at 
stake. 
II. JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS AS DEPOLITICIZATION 
A. Judicialization of Politics 
In general, judicialization of politics means judicial review of policy 
making over the composition of government.
8
 Some scholars even go 
further to define it as ―the ever-accelerating reliance on courts and judicial 
means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, 
and political controversies.‖9 Though it is a phenomenon accompanied by 
the adoption of constitutional courts, judicialization of politics does not 
necessarily result from the U.S. model of judicial review. For example, 
France and Germany, which tutored Japan in modern nation building, 
intensify judicial control of government activities by expanding their own 
constitutional review.
10
 Thus, judicialization of politics does not 
necessarily mean the globalization of the U.S. judicial review. Rather, it 
 
 
 5. JOJI SHISHIDO, KENPO SAIBANKEN NO DOTAI [THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION] (2005).  
 6. See also NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 3 (providing that 
Justices ―shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience‖). 
 7. ELISABETH ZOLLER, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 25 (2008).  
 8. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 265 (2003). 
 9. Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 721 (2006). 
 10. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1671 (2004). 
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denotes national responses to the emerging judicial constitutionalism that 
intends to impose a rule of lawyers on the political process.  
There are criticisms, of course, toward judicialization of politics. 
Recent research shows that courts are coming to judicialize ―mega-
politics,‖ ―matters of outright and utmost political significance that define 
and divide whole polities.‖11 However, they achieve these goals not by 
giving their ―sober second thought‖ that rouses the drunken political 
community,
12
 but rather by relying on technological doctrines that are 
alien to other political actors. For lay critics, this indicates a hypocritical 
attempt of depoliticizing democracy by the oligarchic elite.  
B. Depoliticization 
Professor Rancière, a French political philosopher and critic of judicial 
review, identifies judicialization with bureaucratic depoliticization. He 
argues that judicial review prevents the popular struggle for democracy—
the subjectification of those who are excluded—from being politically 
activated.
13
 The modern state’s subordination to judicial review is, he says, 
actually subordination of the political to the administrative, which means 
―the exercise of a capacity to strip politics of its initiative through which 
the state precedes and legitimizes itself.‖ 14  He argues that the 
―constitutionality checkup‖ (i.e., judicial review) does not really mean the 
submission of the legislative and the executive to the ―government of the 
Bench‖: ―This is really state mimesis of the political practice of litigation. 
Such a mimesis transforms the traditional argument that gives place to the 
show of democracy, the internal gap in equality, into a problem that is a 
matter for expert knowledge.‖15 
 The essence of Professor Rancière’s argument is that what the 
―judicialization of politics‖ really means is the depoliticization of 
constitutional democracy by the bureaucratic state. Interestingly, though 
his criticism is crafted in unjuristic, post-modernistic terms, it merely 
reflects the orthodox understanding of French constitutionalism. That is, 
 
 
 11. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 93, 93 (2008).  
 12. Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions 28–29 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, No. 10-38, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646414. 
 13. JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DIS-AGREEMENT: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 109 (Julie Rose trans., 
1999) (1995); see also Srinivas Aravamudan, Sovereignty: Between Embodiment and 
Detranscendentalization, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 427, 435 (2006) (arguing that Rancière redefines 
democracy as ―a political discourse of self-determination‖ formed out of sovereignty). 
 14. RANCIÈRE, supra note 13, at 109. 
 15. Id. (emphasis added). 
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French democracy is so centripetal that it enables a bureaucratic 
government to ―monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere‖ in the 
name of statutory law, which is deemed to represent the general will of the 
sovereign people.
16
  
By ―centripetal,‖ I mean a tripartite combination: the legal 
homogeneity of society, monopoly of legitimacy by the democratic state, 
and centralized structure of government.
17
 The French model lays down a 
sovereignty of statutory law. Moreover, until recent constitutional reform, 
civil rights in France were defined as ―public liberties,‖ ensuring a citizen 
that he or she has a part in res publica, i.e., the political process. Because 
it was the statute that defined the rights and made them enforceable, the 
idea of a statutory violation of rights per se was a contradictio in adjecto. 
Therefore, anticipating the suffering of citizens, it was the government’s 
duty to seek review of its own actions by the Conseil d'État or Conseil 
Constitutionnel, which are both essentially nonjudicial.
18
  
This centripetal democracy also copes with an authoritarian regime.
19
 
The supremacy of lawmaking authority makes the separation of powers 
functional rather than structural, necessitating a civil service that performs 
separate functions without harming the unity of state.
20
 The aristocratic 
elite, possessing ―politically neutral‖ expertise, interpret and enforce laws, 
thereby contributing to the depoliticization. Thus, those who are excluded 
from this oligarchy have to fight for recognition of their rights in the 
political arena. In that sense, Rancière merely restates a pivotal thesis in 
the French constitutional history: it was partisan politicians, not judges, 
who aligned themselves with the popular movement for democracy and 
bestowed rights on political minority.
21
 That is why he treats judicial 
review as another sophisticated form of bureaucratic depoliticization. 
 
 
 16. See GEORGES LEFEBVRE, THE COMING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 171 (R.R. Palmer 
trans., 2005); JACQUES RANCIÈRE, HATRED OF DEMOCRACY 51–55, 71 (Steve Corcoran trans., 2006); 
CARL SCHMITT, THEORY OF THE PARTISAN 82–83 (G. L. Ulmen trans., 2007) (1975).  
 17. Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Sovereignty and Uniformity: The Challenges for Equal Citizenship 
in the Twenty-first Century, 122 HARV. L. REV. 907 (2009) (reviewing LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN 
AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2008); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2006); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008)). 
 18. See ZOLLER, supra note 7, at 199; see also James E. Beardsley, The Constitutional Council 
and Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1972). 
 19. See YOICHI HIGUCHI, HIKAKU KENPO [COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM] 77 (3d ed. 
1992); ZOLLER, supra note 7, at 75. 
 20. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 263–88 (2d ed. 
1998); Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and 
Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341 (2004). 
 21. See LEFEBVRE, supra note 16, at 201. 
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III. JAPANESE PRACTICE: ANTITHESIS TO JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS 
A. Japanese Antithesis? 
Theoretically, the criticism against judicialization is applicable to 
Japanese judicial review. First of all, we know Japan is a centripetal 
democracy.
22
 Moreover, some scholars point out that the Japanese 
judiciary is one of the bureaucratic branches and that it uses the legal 
reasoning that it is ostensibly neutral to secure its autonomy from partisan 
politicians.
23
 Thus, it is not unfair to predict that the oligarchic elite will go 
further to depoliticize the politics. However, Professor Matsui does not 
expect that judicial activism will give rise to judicialization of politics. It is 
simply unrealistic, he argues, to ask the Court to vindicate Article 9 or 
reshape the welfare state.
24
 Instead, he proposes a ―limited activism,‖ 
enabling the Court to ―protect the democratic process based upon the 
popular sovereignty principle, while paying respect to the outcome of the 
political process.‖25  
I think Professor Matsui’s limited activism speaks to the reality rather 
than the ideal. In fact, the Japanese Supreme Court employs both 
conservatism and activism in order to avoid judicial depoliticization. Here 
I will introduce two cases not discussed in Professor Matsui’s article but 
which are significant to my argument, and I will explore structural reasons 
for the Court’s antijudicialization policy. 
B. Case Law 
1. Limited Conservatism 
In the SDF Officer Enshrinement Case,
26
 the Court used limited 
conservatism to bypass judicialization of politics.
27
 The widow of a Self-
Defense Forces official who died on his duty sued the government and a 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional 
Protection of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and 
Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 419 (2001). 
 23. See BRADLEY RICHARDSON, JAPANESE DEMOCRACY 95 (1997); David S. Law, The Anatomy 
of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009). 
 24. Matsui, supra note 1, at 1422. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1998, Showa 57 (O) no. 902, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 277. 
 27. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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shrine for damages, claiming that the government sponsorship of 
shintoistic apotheosis of her husband violated the constitutional provision 
commanding separation of state and religion,
28
 thereby invading her right 
of religious personality. The Court denied her final appeal on the grounds 
that there was no government act in the case at all and that her religious 
personality is not the kind of right or interest protected by law. By 
invoking the doctrine of ―institutional guarantee,‖29 the Court asserted that 
a government action that does not directly invade the rights of an 
interested party is excluded from judicial review, even when that action is 
unconstitutional: 
The provision . . . is an attempt to indirectly guarantee the freedom 
of religion by setting forth the parameters of actions which the State 
and its organs may not conduct . . . . Therefore, the religious activity 
of the State or its organs which violates this provision should not 
necessarily be deemed unlawful in relation to individual persons 
unless the activity directly infringes upon their religious freedom as 
guaranteed by the Constitution, e.g., by imposing restriction on their 
exercise of religious freedom . . . .
30
 
Note that Officer Enshrinement is a judgment on its merits. This is not a 
case in which a constitutional court hid its real concerns ―behind the cloak 
of standing.‖31 The majority of Justices said that they will not strike down 
an unconstitutional government act unless it infringes on the constitutional 
or other legal rights of a related party, and the widow failed to establish 
such rights. 
2. Limited Activism 
In the Yahata Steel Case,
32
 the Court invoked limited activism to evade 
judicialization of politics. A stockholder brought a derivative suit against 
 
 
 28. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20, para. 3 (prohibiting ―the State and its 
organs‖ from conducting ―any . . . religious activities‖). 
 29. This doctrine was developed in France and Germany and exploited by Schmitt for explaining 
why the Weimar Constitution made the Christian churches a public body. The Japanese judiciary 
borrowed it in order to confer a presumptive constitutionality on government activities deemed 
religious. See CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM 57–59 (2008); CARL SCHMITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 208–12 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans., 2008) (1928); Jan Deutsgh, Some 
Problems of Church and State in the Weimar Constitution, 72 YALE L.J. 457, 464 (1963). 
 30. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1998, Showa 57 (O) no. 902, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 277, 279 (emphasis added). 
 31. Mark V. Tushnet, Commentary, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor 
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1726 (1980). 
 32. SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] June 24, 1970, 24 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/8
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two directors of Yahata Steel who contributed money to the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the then-ruling party in Japan, contending that the 
donation deviated from the business purpose prescribed in the company 
statute and thus was a violation of the directors' duty of care or loyalty. 
Knowing that the lawsuit aimed for the total ban on corporate expenditures 
to political parties, the Court responded with a ruling against the 
stockholder that legalized corporate political donations.
33
 The Court 
declared that a corporation, like a natural person, has a constitutional right 
to perform political acts, and making corporate contributions to political 
parties forms part of that right. Though the Constitution says nothing 
about political parties, it ―surely presupposes the existence of political 
parties, which are important organs of parliamentary democracy.‖ 34 
Accordingly, ―it is matter of course for a business corporation to cooperate 
on the sound development of political parties and making political 
contributions is a way of cooperation.‖35 
The Yahata Court constitutionalized political donations and political 
parties by contriving a theory of ―corporate democracy,‖ which was 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United forty years later.
36
 
This is epoch making, in view of the ingrained elite hostility toward party 
politics and grassroot distrust of party finance in Japan.
37
 However, Yahata 
is not an attempt to judicially structure party politics. Rather, it merely 
gives a belated recognition to the long-existing status quo. The majority’s 
suggestive refutation that the parliamentary government has full authority 
to impose strict regulations on political contributions for anticorruption 
concerns simply leaves the political battle on ―money politics‖ to take its 
own course.
38
  
It should be noted that the Court considered both cases to be 
controversies between private parties, and thus there were no government 
actions available for review. Nonetheless, the Court went the extra mile to 
take up constitutional issues. This reveals that the Court is not traditionally 
conservative, and its judicial philosophy is very situational.
39
 
 
 
[MINSHŪ] 625. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 629. 
 36. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 37. See ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY MOVEMENT IN PREWAR JAPAN 
143–45 (1953).  
 38. SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] June 24, 1970, 24 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 625, 631. 
 39. Yoichi Higuchi, Lösung politischer Streitfragen durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit 
[Solving Political Controversies through Constitutional Adjudication], in 2 FORTSCHRITTE DER 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. Structural Reasons 
1. Principle of Distribution 
The reason for antijudicialization first lies in the past constitutional 
borrowing. The Prussian-German constitutionalism is an imitation of, and 
reaction against, its French counterpart. Its basic concern is the creation, 
not the division, of a sovereign power. It maintains that the state is the 
only source of public authority, but rejects the French idea that the state 
and society stem from one republic. Instead, it embraces a division of state 
and society grounded on the Hegelian dichotomy, which distinguishes a 
System of Morality from a System of Desire.
40
 The concept is that the 
state is a corporation rather than association and that people under its reach 
are its members. Under this organismic constitution, democracy and 
monarchy are checked and balanced by each other, and the democratic 
struggle for public liberties is adroitly replaced by government 
enforcement of private rights that are negative or positive concessions 
from the self-contracting state.
41
 
This constitution calls for a rule of depoliticized private and 
administrative law (Rechtsstaat) based on the separation of the public and 
private spheres. The state strips individuals and groups of powers, 
reassigning to them rights in return.
42
 Property rights are interpreted not as 
delegations of sovereign power to individuals by the state, but as 
guarantees of freedom to citizens through juristic institutions in 
compensation for their depoliticization.
43
 By contrast, the self-binding 
state is free to meddle in the periphery of private autonomy so long as it 
does not disproportionately infringe on the rights of citizens. In other 
words, rights distributed to a citizen are in principle unlimited, while 
 
 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER WELT [PROGRESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN 
THE WORLD] 35, 37–40 (Christian Starck ed., 2004) (arguing that the Japanese high court is active in 
supporting government policies and that the Court has dealt with political questions without triggering 
constitutional review). 
 40. See, e.g., ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 264–65 (1946); Jürgen Habermas, 
Labor and Interaction, in HEGEL’S DIALECT OF DESIRE AND RECOGNITION: TEXTS AND 
COMMENTARY 123, 145–46 (John O’Neill ed., 1996); Bernhard Schlink, The Inherent Rationality of 
the State in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427 (1988–89). 
 41. Duncan Kelly, Revisiting the Rights of Man: Georg Jellinek on Rights and the State, 22 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 493, 512–19 (2004). 
 42. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 62–63 (George Schwab trans., 2006); see 
also Yasuo Hasebe, Book Review, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 189, 192–93 (2004) (reviewing LAWRENCE 
W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY: JAPAN’S TWO CONSTITUTIONS, 
1889–2002 (2002)). 
 43. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.1.5 (2d ed. 2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/8
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powers distributed to the state are principally limited. This is what Carl 
Schmitt called the ―principle of distribution.‖44 In case the government 
violates that principle, the only redress for a politically powerless citizen is 
the judicial enforcement of his or her rights.
45
  
As postwar German legal scholars argue, Rechtsstaat is a functional 
equivalent of democracy introduced by undemocratic polities.
46
 It 
supposes that the evil of state power is mitigated by checks and balances 
among organs of the state and neutralized by rights of the citizen. The state 
as a juristic person is to be normatively self-binding, although how it 
actually limits itself is a ―metajuridical,‖ and hence political, question that 
courts cannot handle.
47
 Accordingly, judicial review under the organismic 
regime preserves rather than nullifies the independence of politics. 
2. Presumption of Constitutionality 
The second reason is that the postwar constitution is not incompatible 
with the principle of distribution. As leading constitutional scholars point 
out, the most profound transformation that the 1946 Constitution has 
brought is the polarization between the sovereignty transferred from the 
Emperor to the People, and the constitutionalized human rights against the 
popular sovereignty.
48
 Equipped with democratic legitimacy, the executive 
acts with the presumption of constitutionality as it did under the prewar 
regime.
49
 Collaborating with its colleague, the judiciary maintains a wall 
of separation between bureaucratic and partisan politics on the pretext of 
its undemocratic characteristics, notwithstanding its new constitutional 
status. As usual, Japanese courts are willing to judicialize rights, but 
unwilling to reshape politics through judicial enforcement of those rights. 
It seems paradoxical, but the adoption of American-style judicial 
review consolidates the traditional canon. As Professor Jackson points out, 
what makes the U.S. model influential is the idea of a written set of rights 
enforced by courts enjoying adjudicatory independence from ―the 
 
 
 44. SCHMITT, supra note 29, at 170–71. 
 45. See id. at 174–75. 
 46. Ralf Poscher, Terrorism and the Constitution, DISSENT, Winter 2009, at 13, 17. 
 47. Kelly, supra note 41, at 523–24. 
 48. See Katsutoshi Takami, From Devine Legitimacy to the Myth of Consensus: The Emperor 
System and Popular Sovereignty, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 9 
(Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); see also Yoichi Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor System: Is 
Revisionism Alive?, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1990). 
 49. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (making the Diet ―the highest organ 
of state power‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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prevailing powers of their time.‖50 This idea accords with the Japanese 
tradition that discourages judges from challenging the legitimacy of 
government actions out of an adjudicatory context. The nation-building 
constitutionalism is a project of steering the state by restricting and 
warranting its power. The organismic constitution dominating the 
Japanese governing elite demands that this steering function be performed 
by various government organs and that no one reign supreme.
51
 As one of 
the government actors, the Japanese Supreme Court is aware that it is not 
the last resort in terms of constitutional politics.  
3. Relativist View of Constitutional Democracy 
The third reason is that the postwar constitution does not clearly 
incorporate the idea of militant democracy in judicial review. A militant 
democracy empowers the judiciary to review ―mega-political‖ questions 
such as the constitutionality of political parties. However, unlike the 
German Basic Law, the 1946 Constitution does not authorize the judiciary 
to protect the constitutional order by denying enemies of the Constitution 
their rights.
52
 Both legal academics and the Court take the silence as 
constitutional refusal of militant democracy. The mainstream scholars 
oppose militant democracy for fear that the conservative governments, the 
real enemy of the Constitution, may use the idea as a plausible excuse to 
persecute citizens who stand against them.
53
  
The Court shares this relativist view on different grounds. A militant 
democracy also presupposes pluralistic, deliberative politics fueled by 
cultural, religious, or ideological division. However, Japan’s postwar 
democracy replaces such political pluralism with claims for economic self-
decision and individual equality. The lack of ethnic diversity in 
constitutional democracy deprives the Court of an incentive to judicialize 
politics.
54
 It induces the Court to respect the independence of politics, by 
which the Court can enforce countermajoritarian rights such as freedom of 
 
 
 50. Vicki C. Jackson, Progressive Constitutionalism and Transnational Legal Discourse, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 285, 293 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
 51. IKUO KABASHIMA & GILL STEEL, CHANGING POLITICS IN JAPAN 20–21 (2010) (stating that 
no single agency is able to dominate decision making in the Japanese government). 
 52. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 18, 21 (Ger.). 
 53. Shojiro Sakaguchi, Japan, in THE ―MILITANT DEMOCRACY‖ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES 219, 226, 232–40 (Markus Thiel eds., 2009). 
 54. The epochal decision made by the Sapporo District Court in 1997 granting an Ainu the 
constitutional right to pursue his or her ethnic identity did not go beyond nonpolitical individual rights. 
See Levin, supra note 22, at 426.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/8
  
 
 
 
 
2011] JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS 1569 
 
 
 
 
occupation and suffrage equality without offending the conservative 
majority.
55
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professor Matsui argues that the judicial conservatism in Japan stems 
from the prewar reception of German statutory positivism. However, the 
German legacy establishes itself as an invisible constitution, rather than 
judicial philosophy. Above all, it brings about a separation of the 
politicized and depoliticized spheres. Since the task of the judiciary is to 
protect nonpolitical citizens against political power by enforcing their 
rights, there is no room for judicialization of politics. 
This classic constitutional canon survived even after Japan adopted a 
new democratic constitution. Under a centripetal democracy, the political 
and administrative branches possess plentiful authority that is presumed 
constitutional, and the judicial branch will overturn that presumption only 
when the government action immoderately violates the rights of the 
citizen. It is beyond Japanese judges’ imaginations and abilities to convert 
all political questions into justiciable cases. In sum, the Japanese Supreme 
Court can be active or conservative, depending on how it assesses the risk 
of judicialization. 
 
 
 55. See Yasuo Hasebe, The Supreme Court of Japan: Its Adjudication on Electoral Systems and 
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